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SCORN
RICHARD DELGADO*
JEAN STEFANCIC**
I. INTRODUCTION'
Every year, the Supreme Court issues between one and two
hundred written opimons.' The more than five hundred volumes
of United States Reports occupy over one hundred feet of shelf
space in a law library Such a body of work can legitimately be
regarded as a corpus, analyzed for style, argument, and use of
rhetorical strategies.3 As with any such analysis the undertak-
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1. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio
Study Center, and the research assistance of Devona Broussard, Bonnie Kae Grover,
Alenka Han, Kelly Robinson, Erich Schwiesow, Karl Stith, and Patricia Templar in
the preparation of this Article. We presented portions of this Article at a colloquium
held at the Villa Serbellom, Bellagio, Italy, June 1993, and benefited from the
comments and suggestions of the scholars in residence.
2. For example, in its 1992 term the Court issued 107 signed opinions including
four shorter per curain decisions. Statistical Recap of Supreme Court's Workload
During Last Three Terms, 62 U.S.L.W. 3124 (Aug. 17, 1993). In prior years, a simi-
lar number of opunons have been issued. For example, the Court issued in 1990 129
signed opinions including three per curam opinions, Statistical Recap of Supreme
Court's Workload During Last Three Terms, 61 U.S.L.W 3098 (Aug. 11, 1992); in
1983, 151 signed opinions including six per curam opinions and in 1982, 141 signed
opinions including 10 per curiam opinions, Statistical Recap of Supreme Court's
Workload During Last Three Terms, 53 U.S.L.W. 3028 (July 24, 1984).
3. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV.
4 (1983) (arguing that the law and its narrative content are inseparable); Thomas
Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297 (1990) [hereinafter
Ross, Innocence] (examining the recurrent theme of the "innocent white victim" in
both academic and judicial discussions of affirmative action); Thomas Ross, The Rhet-
oric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991) [here-
inafter Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty] (discussing ongoing themes in the Supreme
Court's treatment of the constitutional claims of the impoverished); Thomas Ross,
The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black Abstraction, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race] (proposing
that the themes of racism running throughout nineteenth century Supreme Court
decisions, although once thought to be discredited, continue in the opinions of today);
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ing can reward us with insights into the writer's psycholo-
gy-into the way the Court sees itself as an institution, into the
way it thinks of itself and of law '
It is said that if you want to know what a person is like, all
you need to know is whom he adores, whom he venerates and
tries to emulate.5 We believe that the opposite is also true-that
to understand how a person's mind works, it is helpful to know
whom he scorns, at whom he laughs, and whom he regards as
low and outside his circle of concern.6
This Article analyzes the use of scornful humor by the Su-
preme Court. In Part II, we describe the various types of scath-
ing speech, including satire, parody, mockery, irony, and sar-
casm, and situate the kinds courts use within this broader field.
In Part III, we explain the various ways the Justices unleash
humor-against litigants, against lawyers who come before
them, against legal ideas, and against each other-and give
examples of disparaging humor from Supreme Court opimons.
In Part IV, we set out our own version of when a powerful
institution like the Court permissibly may engage in scornful
discourse and when it should not. We argue that the most caus-
Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381 (1989) [hereinafter
Ross, The Richmond Narratives] (discussing the narrative quality of judicial opinions,
especially of the Supreme Court decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989)); Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Re-
grouping in Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1990) (suggesting the need for
continued judicial recognition of the desirability and value of diversity espoused in
Metro Broadcasting).
4. E.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RA-
CIAL JUSTICE (1987) (analyzing various views of race); Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty,
supra note 3, at 1513-46 (reflecting on the Court's current views of poverty); see also
Richard Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, 103 HARV. L.. REV. 1872 (1990) (discussing
generally the use of metaphor and its effects on the consideration of race).
5. See DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 7, 680 (Bergen Evans ed., 1968) (attributing
similar remarks to Ambrose Bierce and John Ruskin).
6. For a few works in this general vein, see ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES
ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963) (discussing individuals stigmatized
by various physical and social malformations and their image as a reflection of how
others view them); IRWIN KATZ, STIGMA: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1981)
(addressing the psychological impact of stigmatizing an individual); Richard Delgado
& Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?,
69 TEX. L. REV. 1929 (1991) (analyzing the possibility that the Law and Literature
movement could have aided the thought processes of the Supreme Court Justices in
ne notorious decisions).
tic types of humor are permissible only when deployed against
the high and the mighty, when used to call attention to the
foibles, weaknesses, pomposities, and abuses of those more pow-
erful than oneself. A root meaning of "humor" is hu-
mus-bringing low, down to earth7 or ground.' On this theory,
it is never permissible to use destructive humor at the expense
of someone weaker or of a lower station than oneself. This dis-
tinction also corresponds to a key function the Supreme Court is
supposed to serve, namely, its countermajoritanan role.9 In a
leading theory of judicial review, the highest court is charged
with policing excesses of powerful actors, like the military and
other branches of government.' ° To these, the Supreme Court
owes a duty of suspiczn.
To the poor, the outcast, and to "discrete and insular minori-
ties"" unable to fend for themselves in the democratic process,
the Supreme Court owes respect and solicitude. The Court is
their defender, the only arm of government capable of redressing
injustice they suffer at the hands of the majority
Our concern is that, today, the Supreme Court has quietly
brought about a stunning reversal. It is applying suspi-
cion-cool, sometimes disrespectful treatment-to blacks, wel-
fare recipients, prisoners, and other disempowered groups. 2
And it is treating with exaggerated respect the military, large
corporations, arms of government, and other empowered ac-
tors." The study of scornful discourse brings this reversal into
sharp relief. If we are right, the Court today is verging close to
becoming an illegitimate institution.
7. JOSEPH T. SHIPLEY, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH WORDS 441 (1984).
8. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1102 (1986).
9. See infra part IV.D.
10. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUsT A THE-
ORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw (1980).
11. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citations
omitted) ("Nor need we enquire whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition callting] for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.").
12. See infra part III.B.
13. See infra part III.A.
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II. TYPES OF SCORNFUL HUMOR
One can distinguish the use of scathing words'4 according to
their character or genre, that is, the kind of words they are; as
well as according to who speaks them, their audience, their tar-
get, and their intent and effect. First we discuss scornful words
in their personal aspect-that is, who speaks and hears them,
who or what is the target, and their intention and effect. Then
we focus more closely on the words themselves, differentiating
among the various types of scornful discourse in common use.
A. Scornful Speech. The Personal Aspect
A scornful or satiric speaker can have high or low prestige.
When he wrote his famous satires of French society," Voltaire
was a well known and respected writer whose prestige and pow-
er were inferior to the wealthy whose vices he mocked, but not
greatly so. 6 A newspaper columnist writing today about the ex-
cesses of government spending is an example of a writer of mod-
erate social power writing about an institution of even greater
power. When Jonathan Swift wrote his famous satire of
humanity's foibles, Gulliver's Travels,7 his target 8 was power-
ful in the aggregate, but weak individually Mane Antoinette's
notorious remark about the poor illustrated a powerful individ-
ual speaking cavalierly about those of much lower station, mak-
14. Throughout this Article, we employ more or less interchangeably this term
("scathing words"), as well as the related terms "scorn" and "scornful words," "caustic
humor," and so on, to designate the field of pointed wit and humor generally. With-
in this broad field, we draw a number of distinctions, see infra part II.B., insofar as
these help us understand and analyze the Supreme Court's deployment of humor
and sarcasm, see infra part III.
15. E.g., VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE AND OTHER WRITINGS (Haskell M. Block ed., The
Modern Library 1956) (1759). Of particular note are Candide, which mocks the opti-
mism of Leibniz and Rousseau, and Philosophical Letters, which comments that poor
taste swept over France when the French began to prefer British playwrights such
as Shakespeare to natives such as Racine.
16. For further discussion of Voltaire and his work, see THEODORE BESTERMAN,
VOLTAIRE (3d ed. 1976) (detailing the life and works of Voltare); PETER GAY,
VOLTAIRE'S POLITICS: THE POET AS REALIST (2d ed. 1988) (discussing Voltaire's career
as a commentator and political observer).
17. JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS (Martin Price ed., 1963) (1726).
18. That is, all humanity.
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ing light of their predicament. 9 As we shall see, Supreme
Court opimons sometimes employ humor in each of the above
ways.
Humorous discourse also can be distinguished in terms of its
intention or effect. Some of the classic exponents of satire em-
ployed wit with what they considered an educative purpose, that
is to improve or to edify 20 For example, Alexander Pope wrote
about what he perceived as the frailties and vanities of wom-
en.2 His purpose seems not to have been intentional unkind-
ness, but rather to amuse and entertain while gently poking fun.
Others, however, made fun at the expense of women22 or weak
social groups, such as dunces, bumpkins, or rustics.' On the
19. "Qu'ils mangent de la brwche" or "Let them eat cake," attributed to the soon-
to-be-beheaded queen on the occasion of being informed that her subjects were hun-
gry and lacked bread. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 329 (2d ed. 1953).
20. E.g., EDWARD A. BLOOM & LILLIAN D. BLOOM, SATIRE'S PERSUASIVE VOICE 205
(1979) (discussing, for example, the use of political satire to cast aside precious no-
tions about the infallibility of the monarchy); LEONARD FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO
SATIRE 13-15, 17-18, 28-33, 58-59, 212-15, 257-59 (1967) [hereinafter FEINBERG, IN-
TRODUCTION TO SATIRE] (claining that satire unmasks hypocrisy and other human
frailties); GILBERT HIGHET, THE ANATOMY OF SATIRE 18-19 (1962) (discussing
satirists' desire to make people see the truth); see also LEONARD FEINBERG, THE
SATIRIST: HIS TEMPERAMENT, MOTIVATION AND INFLUENCE (1963) [hereinafter
FEINBERG, THE SATIRIST] (analyzing the satirist's personality and the impetus behind
satire, including morality, creativity and attempts to adjust to society); LINDA
HUTCHEON, A THEORY OF PARODY: THE TEACHINGS OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY ART
FORM s (1985) (explaining the many functions of satire, including its attempt to edi-
fy).
21. ALEXANDER POPE, SELECTED POETRY AND PROSE (Robin Sowerby ed., 1988) (see
particularly Epistle to Miss Blount with the Works of Boiture, at 55 (1712); To Mrs.
M.B. On Her Birthday, at 149 (1724); Epistle to a Lady: Of the Characters of Wom-
en, at 158 (1735)).
22. JUVENAL, Satire VI, in JUVENAL'S SATIRES (William Gifford trans., 1802, rev. &
ann. John Warrngton, Everyman's Library 1954) (creating a series of derogatory
portraits of women). Juvenal lived c. 50 A.D. to 130 A.D.
23. JUVENAL, Satire I, supra note 22 (pointing out the gluttony of the wealthy and
the foolhardiness of the poor who depend on them); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A MID-
SUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM (Houghton Mifflin 1969) (1598) (creating the fools Aguecheek
and Belch for the audience to ridicule); PHILLIP WYLIE, A GENERATION OF VIPERS
194-217 (1955) (containing a scathing denunciation of "momism"); see also infra notes
194-211 and accompanying text (discussing in greater detail the past and present
targets of the satirist). But see FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note 20,
at 49-50 (pointing out that the fool or "schlennel" sometimes sees the truth the rest
of us miss).
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whole, however, most of the classic writers reserved their arrows
for society's favored few 24
Finally, scornful discourse can be aimed at an audience con-
sisting of the target group, someone else, or both. If aimed at the
target group, the impact is apt to be sharper and more immedi-
ate. Accordingly, the satirist often moderates Ins or her remarks,
writing with a little more restraint or delicacy than usualY
But if the target is a large group or humanity in general, feel-
ings are less exposed and the writing is apt to have a more no-
holds-barred quality 26
B. Scornful Speech. Types and Genres
According to most theorists, humor always has a social dimen-
sion wherein a speaker and an audience mutually acknowledge
certain beliefs or norms of behavior.27 Much of it is also tacitly
aggressive, using words to rearrange the distance between
speaker and target, reiterating or calling into question the social
hierarchy 28
This Article is concerned with humor that is expressly or im-
pliedly political, and particularly that which has a more or less
vituperative-as opposed to an innocent, playful, or mirth-
ful--quality 29 Within the general field of scornful speech we
24. See, e.g., BLOOM & BLOOM, supra note 20, at 205 (discussing satire armed at
the monarchy); FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note 20, at 29-32 (observ-
ing that most satirists criticize named individuals or ideas and institutions); id. at
212-15 (describing the technique of "unmasking" the object of satire); see also infra
part IV (arguing on general grounds that this latter is the most defensible use of
humor and satire).
25. See FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note 20, at 29-31.
26. See id. at 32-34.
27. E.g., id. at 11-13; see also WAYNE BOOTH, A RHETORIC OF IRONY 47-86 (1974);
D.C. MUECKE, THE COMPASS OF IRONY (1969).
28. E.g., FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note 20, at 6, 30, 206-09, 220-
21 (describing detachment, alienation, distancing, and the creation of the feeling of
superiority in the genre); SIGMUND FREUD, JOKES AND THEIR RELATION TO THE UN-
CONSCIOUS 200 (James Strachey ed. & trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1960) (1905).
29. We do not mean "political" in any pejorative sense. A court or other speaker
could employ caustic humor--destructive wit--quite appropriately, as for example
when calling to account a refractory governmental agency that has been guilty of a
long course of misconduct. See FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note 20,
at 86-90.
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deal with satire and its cousins, parody, caricature, and irony 0
Each genre employs ridicule, sarcasm, and mockery to achieve
its effect."' No generally agreed upon typology classifies these
relatives; the categories overlap to a considerable extent.82
Satire has a long history Many cultures used satiric utteranc-
es to drive away evil spirits.8" The Greeks had no word for sat-
ire per se, 4 but Aristophanes' comedies ridiculed the Atheman
literary elite mercilessly and today are considered early exem-
plars of the genre.85 Juvenal, the most famous Roman satirist,
also aimed his quill at the upper class. 6 According to one clas-
sicist, "the 'smart set' of Domitian's RomeU was sufficiently cor-
rupt to furnish innumerable targets for his barbed
shafts ))37 Though some medieval bawdy plays made fun of
both kings and clergy, satiric discourse did not flourish in the
Middle Ages.8 Satire requires a tension between assent to and
rejection of previously accepted social norms, something that
was missing during much of this period. But by the seventeenth
century, French society was so rife with religious and social
hypocrisy that Moliere was able to mock those who piously
feigned humility while privately scheming for worldly wealth
and position. 9 Satire reached its apogee in eighteenth century
England when Jonathan Swift composed his biting diatribes
exposing the venality of the British ruling class.4" Though polit-
30. On similarities and differences among these forms of humor or ironic dis-
course, see generally FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note 20, at 93;
HUTCHEON, supra note 20; LINDA HUTCHEON, IRONIES BINARIES (forthcoming 1994).
31. On these tools of the iromst's trade, see BOOTH, supra note 27, at 28-31;
FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note 20, at 93, 112; HUTCHEON, supra
note 20, dt 5, 6, 20, 24-26, 40-42, 50-68.
32. E.g., FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note 20, at 186. For various
overviews and typologies, see HUTCHEON, supra note 30, -at 47-58.
33. ARISTOTLE, IV THE POETICS 1448f-1449a (Steven Halliwell trans., 1986) (claim-
ing the function of satire was to drive out evil spirits, improve fertility, etc.).
34. The Art of Literature: Satire, 23 ENCY. BRITANNICA 173 (1993).
35. See ARISTOPHANES, THE FROGS (B.B. Rogers trans., 1909).
36. See H.J. Rose, Introduction to JUVENAL, supra note 22, at vi.
37. Id. at viii.
38. See HIGHET, supra note 20, at 44 (asserting that little satire was written dur-
ing this period).
39. See, e.g., JEAN BAPTIST POQUELIN DE MOLtiRE, TARTUFFE act 1, sc. 5 (Richard
Wilbur trans., 1965) (1669). Voltare, a century later, continued this tradition. See
VOLTAIRE, supra note 15.
40. See, e.g., SWIFT, supra note 17 (satirizing English people, representing man-
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ical humor in the nineteenth century was more restrained, the
tradition was carried on by Mark Twain who wrote about the
foibles of the European aristocracy during the Middle Ages,4
and more currently by such writers and commentators as H.L.
Mencken,42 Sinclair Lewis,43 and Russell Baker."
Although the genre has a lengthy lineage, the word itself is
not easily defined. "Satire" derives from the Latin satura, mean-
ing a poetic medley characterized by a mocking spirit or tone.4"
Satire is a deliberately distorted image of a person, institution,
or society written to entertain." It can take the form of beast
kind in general, and Whigs in particular); JONATHAN SWIFT, A MODEST PROPOSAL
(1729) (proposing to alleviate poverty by eating infants of beggars); JONATHAN SWIFT,
TALE OF A TUB (1704) (ridiculing the many extreme corruptions in religion and
learning).
41. MARK TWAIN, A CONNECTICUT YANKEE IN KING ARTHUR'S COURT (Modem
Library 1949) (1889).
42. See, e.g., H.L. MENCKEN, NOTES ON DEMOCRACY (1926) (suggesting that democ-
racy is the most charming form of government because it is based on propositions
which are palpably not true).
43. See, e.g., SINCLAIR LEWIS, BABBITT (1922) (satirizing complacent mediocrity).
Other political satirists of note include Oscar Wilde, see, e.g., OSCAR WILDE, THE
IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST (1899) (satirizing birth, love, marriage, death and
respectability-everything people consider important), and G.B. Shaw, see, e.g., QUIN-
TESSENCE OF G.B.S. THE WIT AND WISDOM OF BERNARD SHAW (Stephen Winsten ed.,
1949) (collection of excerpts from Shaw's works).
44. See, e.g., RUSSELL BAKER, THERE'S A COUNTRY IN MY CELLAR (1990) (chrom-
cling American life at the breakdown point).
45. The Art of Literature: Satire, 23 ENCY. BRITANNICA 173 (1993); see also
QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTE ORATORIA 8.6.54 (H.E. Butler trans., 1920-22) (describing the
early origins of the term). On satire as a medley of devices, including grotesquerie,
sentiment, parody, demasking, see FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note
20, at 80-81, 89.
46. Professor Feinberg describes it as "a playfully critical distortion of the famil-
iar," FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note 20, at 19, whose essential qual-
ity is entertainment, despite being "permeated with disapprobation, complaint,
expose, denunciation, rebuke, [and] condemnation," id. at 59. For an analysis of a
related form, allegory, see id. at 201-05. Other scholars have defined satire in vari-
ous ways, but humor coupled with criticism are the most frequently mentioned ele-
ments. For example, Gilbert Highet describes satire as evoking a particular emotion
which is a
blend of amusement and contempt. In some satirists, the amusement far
outweighs the contempt. In others it almost disappears: It changes into a
sour sneer, or a grin smile, or a wry awareness that life cannot all be
called reasonable or noble. But, whether it is uttered in a hearty laugh,
or in that characteristic involuntary expression of scorn, the still-born
laugh, a single wordless exhalation coupled with a backward gesture of
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fables, imaginary voyages, character sketches, anecdotes, prov-
erbs, homilies, and the like.' The writer marshals social
themes and narratives to expose the incongruity between what
is said and what is done." As will be seen, courts employ satire
in a remarkable number of these senses. 9 When they do so,
they are apt to use the subtler tools of the satirist's art, includ-
ing irony, mockery, ridicule, and belittlement, rather than the
more heavy-handed tools of invective, burlesque, derision, rail-
lery, and so on."
Closely related to satire are parody and caricature." In paro-
dy, the author imitates a person or a work in an exaggerated
way so as to make him or it appear ridiculous. Often, the more
the head-it is inseparable from satire.
HIGHET, supra note 20, at 21.
47. See, e.g., LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (Univ. of Cal.
Press 1982) (1865); MIGUEL DE CERVANTES, DON QUIXOTE DE LA MANCHA (Macmillan
1957) (1605); SWIFT, supra note 40; see also FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE,
supra note 20, at 46-55 (discussing, among others, Capek's, Ambrose Bierce's, and
James Thurber's contribution to these styles); HIGHET, supra note 20, at 39.
48. FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note 20, at 15-17.
49. See, e.g., THE JUDICIAL HUMORIST 52-75 (W.L. Prosser ed., 1985) (describing
cases of bumbling attorneys or judges); id. at 139-43 (depicting bullying lawyers who
got their comeuppance); id. at 258-73 (depicting bumbling bureaucrats). In satirizing
the cases before them, courts also have resorted to animal fables, see znfra notes
166-67 and accompanying text, and the tried and true method of reductio ad absur-
dum, see infra notes 105-107, 124-26 and accompanying text; see also FEINBERG,
INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note 20, at 112-16. For grotesque examples of satire,
see Commentary, He-Manifesto of Post-Mortem Legal Feminism (From the Desk of
Mary Doe), 105 HARV. L. REVUE 13 (1992) (withdrawn, copy on file with author)
(parodying scholarship and brutal death of slain law professor, Mary Joe Frug), and
a response, Susan Conwell & Andrea Brenneke, Senseless & Insensitive, THE RE-
CORDER, Apr. 25, 1992 (criticizing lampoon of the murdered professor as tasteless
and mean spirited).
50. For examples of a few opinions and trial proceedings which descended to these
levels, see infra notes 76-87, 95-101, 104-05, 127-45, 156-57 and accompanying text;
see also JUDICIAL HUMORIST, supra note 49, at 130, 139-43, 243-45. But see id. at vii
(disapproving of this practice); James D. Gordon III, Introduction: Humor in Legal
Education and Scholarship, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 313, 318 (urging that humor be
used carefully).
51. See BOOTH, supra note 27, at 91-134; FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE,
supra note 20, at 116-17, 184-92. See generally HUTCHEON, supra note 20. In parody
the writer "takes an existing work which was created with a serious pur-
pose He then makes the work, or the form, look ridiculous, by infusing it with
incongruous ideas, or exaggerating its aesthetic devices; or by putting the ideas
into an inappropriate form." HIGHET, supra note 20, at 13.
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familiar the subject, the more successful the parody52 An early
Classical Greek poet used parody to mimic and mock Homeric
epics by describing a battle between frogs and mice in grandiose
language." In recent times, Victor Borge imitates Liberace, Jay
Leno or Dana Carvey parodies a U.S. President, and a battery
commercial mimics other products. Caricature likewise relies on
exaggeration. It takes a troublesome quality of a person and
focuses on that feature alone, distorting through oversimplifica-
tion to produce a desired effect.5 4 Dickens' character, Pecksniff,
and Hogarth's drawings are classic examples."
Ridicule raises laughter against a person or thing by making
him or it the object of jest or sport. 6 Sarcasm intensifies the
tone of ridicule, making the gibe or taunt more caustic or bit-
ing.57 Mockery jeers and scoffs. It makes a counterfeit represen-
tation of something, mimicking and distorting with ridicule,
derision, and belittlement. 5
Irony, according to Northrup Frye, is "the great engine of
comedy and satire."59 It can be verbal or situational.0 Thomas
52. On the use of familiar themes in parody, see FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO
SATIRE, supra note 20, at 184-85.
53. A mock-heroic Greek poem of early but uncertain date and authorship, the
Batrachomyomachia, translated as the Battle of the Frogs and Mice, is a savage sat-
ire of Homer's Iliad. See THE READER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 84 (William R. Benet ed.,
1965).
54. On caricature generally, see FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note
20, at 116-19; JOHN FELSTINER, THE LIES OF ART: MAX BEERBOHM'S PARODY AND
CARICATURE (1972); HUTCHEON, supra note 20, at 38-40 (describing specifically bur-
lesque and parody).
55. CHARLES DICKENS, MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT (1844) (illustrating the self-propagating
nature of selfishness). On Hogarth and his drawing, see HOGARTH AND ENGLISH
CARICATURE (Francis D. Klingender ed., 1944).
56. On ridicule, see FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note 20, at 207-10
(dealing with derision and cartoons); HUTCHEON, supra note 20, at 5-6, 24-26, 50-68.
57. On sarcasm generally, see FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note 20,
at 180 (labeling sarcasm a form of "overobvious" verbal irony). On invective, see
HIGHET, supra note 20, at 155.
58. On mocking and mimicry, see, for instance, FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SAT-
IRE, supra note 20, at 184-92 (discussing a specific type of mimicry-parody); id. at
108-12 (discussing invective and denunciation); DAVID WORCESTER, THE ART OF SAT-
IRE 19 (1940) (differentiating "gross" from "satiric" invective).
59. NORTHRUP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITICISM: FOUR ESSAYS 223 (1957); see also
BOOTH, supra note 27, at ix-x.
60. On verbal irony, see FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note 20, at
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Hardy employed the latter category in his novels dealing with
the role of fate in human lives.6 Primarily a storyteller's de-
vice, situational irony seldom finds its way into judicial opinions,
because it requires a degree of elaboration. Verbal irony, howev-
er, often does appear.62 It is a figure of speech in which the in-
tended meaning is other than that which is expressed.63 It can
take the form of mock seriousness, or showering attention on
minutiae while ignoring what is important.' Voltaire's two
generals, each of whom thanked God for their great victory, are
a classic example of a third form, insincere praise.65 The state-
ment seems to depict the generals as pious, but in the next in-
stant, the reader realizes they are vain, self-deluding fools.
With these distinctions in mind, it is time to turn our atten-
tion to the use of these figures in the American judicial system.
III. IRONY AND SATIRE IN THE SUPREME COURT
Courts use humor and sarcasm fairly often, in ways not all of
which are wrong by any means. Humor can brighten a dry and
technical opinion, relieve a discussion that otherwise would be
dull and lifeless.66 As we have seen, humor can also have an
educative function. Many of the world's great writers employed
wit and satire to change the behavior of their readers. They used
it to point out flaws and foibles of human nature generally, or'to
178-83. On situational or dramatic irony, see id. at 157-75.
61. See, e.g., THOMAS HARDY, THE MAYOR OF CASTERBRIDGE (Heritage Press 1964)
(1886); THOMAS HARDY, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE (Macmillan 1975) (1878);
THOMAS HARDY, TESS OF THE D'URBERVILLES (Macmillan 1974) (1891). For a more
recent tour de force, see Joseph Heller's brilliant CATCH-22 (1962).
62. See, e.g., infra notes 100-01, 131-32, 156-57 and accompanying text.
63. See BOOTH, supra note 27, at ix; FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra
note 20, at 178-83; MUECKE, supra note 27, at 42-52; see also HUTCHEON, supra note
20 (distingishing various continua for understanding irony: mild to provocative; rhe-
toncal to assaultive; playful to irresponsible, etc.).
64. On these approaches to irony, see BOOTH, supra note 27 at 1-3; FEINBERG,
INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note 20.
65. VOLTAIRE, supra note 15, at 143; see BOOTH, supra note 27, at 10-11. On the
techniques of feigned or insincere praise, see FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE,
supra note 20, at 178-79.
66. See DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 442 (1963); Adalberto
Jordan, Note, Imagery, Humor and the Judicial Opinion, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 693,
700-02, 709-21 (1987).
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chide official figures they saw as abusing their authority or
getting caught up in their own self-importance."
The Supreme Court also has a supervisory and educative
function." When it deploys humor to admomsh an overstepping
governmental figure, unresponsive bureaucrat, or tedious, long-
winded attorney, no one could object. But at other times, the
Court's use of humor and sarcasm goes beyond entertainment or
edification. This Section discusses examples of these more trou-
blesome uses. We employ the rough classification system devel-
oped in Part II, distinguishing judicial texts in terms of their
target and the type of sarcasm deployed. As will be shown, the
two dimensions are not unrelated: the Court tends to differenti-
ate, employing one type of humor for one type of target, and
another type. for another. Part IV then offers our own thoughts
on the legitimate role of humor in Supreme Court discourse.
A. When the Target Is an Institutin or Person of High Social
Standing
The Supreme Court directs humor or sarcasm at institutions
or persons of high prestige much less often than it does at ones
of lower prestige, and when it does, so its language is apt to be
relatively restrained: it uses a scalpel, not a sledge hammer. For
example, the Supreme Court recently upheld a challenge to the
FBI's policy regarding the exemption from disclosure, pursuant
to the Freedom of Information Act, of Bureau records compiled
in the course of a criminal investigation. 9 The Bureau had in-
sisted that virtually all documents it obtained in the course of a
criminal investigation were confidential, despite a federal stat-
ute that required them to establish that each requested docu-
67. On the edifying function of humor and satire, see supra note 20 and accompa-
nying text; infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
68. It has a supervisory relationship to the lower federal courts, of course, as well
as to state courts on matters dealing with the interpretation of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Beyond that, law is said to have a teaching function m general. See, e.g.,
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Our
Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher To declare that in the
administration of the crnnmal law the end justifies the means would bring
terrible retribution.").
69. Department of Justice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014 (1993).
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ment reasonably could be expected to disclose the identity of, or
information from, a confidential source." Despite the agency's
clear violation, the Court's language was relatively mild. The
Court merely noted that its holding was an attempt to remain
consistent with its obligation to construe the Act's exemptions as
narrowly as Congress intended. 1
Sixteen years earlier, the Court considered a challenge to
federal action under the Endangered Species Act of 1973.72 The
Court determined that the government had continued to appro-
priate and spend public funds for a certain project even after
congressional committees were apprised of the impact upon the
survival of the snail darter, in contravention of a section of the
Act *vhich required federal departments and agencies to cooper-
ate with the Secretary of the Interior in furtherance of the pur-
poses of the Act.73 Indeed, it evidently thought the breach fla-
grant enough to warrant comment, observing that the plain lan-
guage of the Act and the legislative history showed the value of
endangered species as "incalculable" and that the balance had
been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest
priority 4
The degree of restraint employed reminds one of that found in
the more famous case of Brown v. Board of Educatin." In
1954, the Supreme Court finally declared that separate but
equal schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution." The case was of historical importance.
The Court conceivably might have taken that occasion to sharply
chastise the many school boards across the nation that had been
70. Id. at 2017-18.
71. Id. at 2024. Contrast this degree of restraint with the sharper language the
Court employed in dealing with a California agency that it believed was overzealous
in protecting public access to beaches. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 838 (1987) ("Rewriting the argument to eliminate the play on words makes
clear that there is nothing to it. It is quite impossible to understand how a require-
ment that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans'
property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house.").
72. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
73. Id. at 193.
74. Id. at 187, 194.
75. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("Brown 1").
76. Id. at 495.
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operating separate schools on the basis of color. Unfortunately,
yet predictably, it did not do so. It described Topeka's action as
generating a feeling of inferiority7 and its policy of segregation
as, at most, inherently unequal."8 In a later ruling, the Court
permitted local authorities to proceed to dismantle separate
systems with "all deliberate speed" 9 and enjoined them to
"make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance""
with the Court's prior ruling and, with equal delicacy and re-
straint, to "fashion[] and effectuat[e] the decrees guided by
equitable principles.""l
These examples are only suggestive, and it is possible to find
opinions in which the Court rebukes a governmental figure
somewhat more harshly 82 On the whole, however, our review
indicates that the Court keeps its sharpest weapons sheathed
when dealing with figures of high prestige, even when it clearly
finds they have transgressed. In recent times, particularly, it
has reserved its unkindest language for parties who are weak
and of a lower station.
B. When the Target Is an Institution or Person of Relatwely Low
Standing
As we mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court, and other courts
as well, deploy humor and satire more frequently in connection
with disempowered litigants. Moreover, when the Court attacks
these parties, its language is apt to have a sharper, more acerbic
quality than when it directs its wit upward. Oddly, the Court
seems to take little note of certain early cases in which its own
caustic language became notorious.
77. Id. at 494.
78. Id. at 495.
79. 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) ("Brown IF).
80. Id. at 300.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (holding that to
permit the President to determine in each case the existence of his own privilege to
withhold information "would be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers
and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government").
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Two of those early cases are Buck v. Bell' and Plessy v.
Ferguson.' In Buck v. Bell, Justice Holmes upheld an order
providing for the sterilization of Came Lee Buck, a young, sexu-
ally active woman asserted to have been mentally retarded and
herself the mother of a child also said to be retarded. 5 With
little consideration of the mother's interest or of less restrictive
alternatives, Holmes acquiesced.86 The opimon is curt and full
of facile analogies." Holmes rejects a plausible equal protection
argument as one of last resort,88 and concludes with the
dismissive pronouncement, "Three generations of imbeciles are
enough."
89
A few decades earlier, Justice Brown wrote the opinion of the
Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, upholding separate but equal treat-
ment of American blacks. A state provision had required that
black railroad passengers ride only in cars for blacks, a practice
the plaintiffs challenged as a violation of equal protection.9'
Justice Brown found that the rule did not violate constitutional
equality, because the blacks' car was equal to that of whites.9 2
The plaintiffs of course maintained that the very separation of
passengers by race degraded them, thus violating the
Fourteenth Amendment. Brown dismissed this argument,
holding that the law could not, and should not, attempt to re-
dress social inequality 93 Further, if the blacks found the
railroad's separate treatment offensive it was "solely because the
colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." 94
83. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
84. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
85. Buck, 274 U.S. at 205. But see STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN
335-36 (1981) (pointing out that her child may have been normal and the case collu-
sive); MICHAEL SHAPIRO & ROY SPECE, BIOETHICS AND LAW 404-05 (1981); id. at 102
(Supp. 1991).
86. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207-08.
87. Id. at 207 (companng sterilization to vaccination during times of epidemic).
88. Id. at 208.
89. Id. at 207.
90. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
91. Id. at 538-40.
92. Id. at 543.
93. Id. at 551.
94. Id.
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These lines are, of course, now notorious. Yet that notoriety
has stopped neither today's Court nor the individual Justices
from issuing opinions as sarcastic and high-handed as the early
ones. For example, in United States v. Sioux Nation of Indi-
ans," the Sioux tribe sued the government for the fair value of
lands in the Black Hills region of South Dakota which the gov-
ernment promised them in the Fort Laraie Treaty of 1868, but
which later were taken by the United States." The majority
opinion presented a detailed history of the issue on the way to
holding that the Sioux were indeed entitled to compensation."
Justice Rehnquist objected to much of the Court's historical
presentation and offered his own, drawn, he maintained, from
historians "not writing for the purpose of having their conclu-
sions or observations inserted in the reports of congressional
committees.""8
Tins jab at the other members of the Court and the historians
upon whom they relied did not content Rehnquist. He went on to
quote from Samuel Eliot Monson's description of the Sioux, in
order to describe the plaintiffs as barbaric:
The plains Indians seldom practiced agriculture or other
primitive arts, but they were fine physical specimens; and m
warfare, once they had learned the use of the rifle, [were]
much more formidable than the Eastern tribes who had slow-
ly yielded to the white man. Tribe warred with tribe
They lived only for the day, recogmzed no rights of property,
robbed or killed anyone if they thought they could get away
with it, inflicted cruelty without a qualm, and endured tor-
ture without flinching."
Even if true, the historic description Rehnquist adduces had
little to do with the claim the Sioux nation was maintaimng
against the government. It could only serve as backdrop for his
claim that "the Indians did not lack their share of villainy ei-
95. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
96. Id. at 374-84.
97. Id. at 374-84, 424.
98. Id. at 435 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 436-37 (quoting SAMUEL MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMER-
ICAN PEOPLE 539-40 (1965)).
1076
ther,"100 one that at best only tangentially advanced resolution
of the issue before the Court. Justice Rehnquist scorned the
Indians, pure and simple, thinking his readers would do so as
well-just as Holmes did in Buck v. Bell. He nnsjudged his audi-
ence. He failed to persuade a majority of his fellow Justices.
And, among Indians and Indian lawyers, at least, his opinion
acquired instant infamy
In the short time he has been on the bench, Justice Antonin
Scalia has distinguished himself for his quick tongue and acerbic
wit. In two cases having to do with environmental standing, he
appears to have crossed the line between lively language and
impermissibly caustic speech. Until ruling in these two cases,
the Court had recognized a fairly generous basis for stand-
ing-environmental harm.'' But in Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federatzon'0 ' the Court severely restricted the previously liber-
al "personal stake" requirements of individuals seeking environ-
mental standing. In National Wildlife Federatin, Scalia held
that
Rule 56(e) is assuredly not satisfied by averments which
state only that one of respondent's members uses unspecified
portions of an immense tract of territory It will not do to
"presume" the missing facts because without them the affida-
vits would not establish the injury that they generally allege.
That converts the operation of Rule 56 to a circular prome-
nade 103
His "circular promenade" comment might, strike most readers as
gratuitous, but -it is positively restrained in comparison to his
approach in another environmental standing case, Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife."4 Defenders centered around the standing
100. Id. at 435.
101. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (finding that
"a]esthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important
ingredients of the quality of life m our society" and can support a claim of injury-m-
fact if the party seeking review is among those injured). See generally Christopher
D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects,
45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
102. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
103. Id. at 889.
104. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
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of an environmental group to bring suit under federal regula-
tions governing the extraterritorial application of the Endan-
gered Species Act.' Members of an environmental orgamza-
tion had submitted affidavits stating that they had used the pre-
cise lands in question, but Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
held that "the affiants' profession of an 'inten[t]' to return is
simply not enough."' He ridiculed even the terms in which
the plaintiffs framed their suit, including an "inelegantly styled
'ecosystem nexus,' [and] other theories alas, the 'ammal
nexus' approach and the 'vocational nexus' approach."' °' A
dissent by Justice Blackmun turned the ridicule on Scalia, point-
ing out that "a Federal Torts Claims Act plaintiff alleging loss of
consortium should make sure to furmsh this Court with a 'de-
scription of concrete plans' for her nightly schedule of attempted
activities."'
C. When the Target Is an Idea or Legal Argument the Judge
Thinks Ridiculous
Justice Scalia's derision in Defenders of Wildlife extends be-
yond the plaintiff personally, illustrating a third category of
cases in which the Court deploys humor against an entire legal
idea or argument. In Defenders, Scalia made plain that he
thought the idea of expansive standing in environmental litiga-
tion bordered on the ridiculous." 9 Prison and law reform cases
often provoke the same reaction. For several centuries, prisoners
and others have employed the historic writ of habeas corpus to
challenge the conditions under which they were confined or their
confinement itself."0 Recently, conservative judges have begun
105. Id. at 2135.
106. Id. at 2138.
107. Id. at 2139. To contrast the harsh words used here with the much more sub-
dued language employed in an earlier case brought under the same statute where
the offending party was an arm of government, see supra notes 72-74 and accompa-
nying text.
108. Id. at 2154 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See infra part III.E. (discussing other
Justices as targets).
109. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
110. On the writ generally, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE §§ 28.1-28.7 (2d ed. 1992).
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cutting back on the writ's scope by imposing procedural hurdles
in the way of prisoners attempting to employ it. Judge Richard
Posner, for example, has complained that prison writ-writers file
so many requests because they have too much free time on their
hands."' They would be far better off if they spent the time re-
habilitating themselves and thinking about their sins."' Re-
cently, the Supreme Court echoed this view in a pair of deci-
sions. In Gomez v. United States Distnct Court,"' a prisoner
on death row filed a writ challenging, on Eighth Amendment
grounds, California's use of lethal gas in executions. The Court
dismissed in a per curamn opinion, explaining that
[e]quity must take into consideration the State's strong inter-
est in proceeding with its judgment and Harris' obvious at-
tempt at mampulation This claim could have been
brought more than a decade ago. There is no good reason for
this abusive delay, which has been compounded by last-min-
ute attempts to manipulate the judicial process."'
In dissent, Justices Stevens and Blackmun described in length
the horrors of death by cyanide gas."' They also made the ob-
vious point that if execution by gas is unconstitutional, then
delay in bringing the claim, even if unjustified, can hardly en-
dow the state with authority to violate the Constitution."'
Justice O'Connor showed the frustration of a law-and-order
judge confronting constitutional niceties in Duckworth v.
Eagan."' In Duckworth, a prisoner who confessed to a stab-
bing brought a habeas corpus claim in federal court based on the
111. Merritt v. Faulkner, 823 F.2d 1150, 1157 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J., concurring)
("Inmates love turmng the tables on the pnson's staff by hauling it into court. They
like the occasional vacation from prison to testify in court."), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
986 (1987); see also McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1323 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner,
J., dissenting) ("I merely record in passing my amazement" at prisoners' suits.);
Free v. United States, 879 F.2d 1535, 1536 (7th Cir. 1989).
112. McKeever, 689 F.2d at 1323 (Posner, J., dissenting) ("[I]nstead of reflecting on
the wrongs they have done to society our convicts prosecute an endless series of
mostly inaginary grievances against society.").
113. 112 S. Ct. 1652 (1992).
114. Id. at 1653.
115. Id. at 1654 (Stevens and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1656.
117. 492 U.S. 195 (1989).
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argument that he was given insufficient warning before confess-
ing."8 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court blandly
rejected the claim, but Justice O'Connor, concurring, felt com-
pelled to do more:
Eighteen state and federal judges have now given plenary
consideration to respondent's Miranda claims. None of these
judges has intimated any doubt as to respondent's guilt or
the voluntariness and probative value of his confession. After
seven years of litigation, the initial determination has
been found to be the correct one. In my view, the federal
courts' exercise of habeas jurisdiction in tis case has served
no one 119
It is, of course, a new doctrine of appellate review that would
predicate the value of that review solely on its reaching a differ-
ent determination from that of the trial court. In dissent, Justice
Marshall commented on Justice O'Connor's non sequitur and
"profound distaste for Miranda," asking "[how else to explain
the remarkable statement that 'no significant federal values are
at stake' when Miranda claims are raised in federal habeas
corpus proceedings?" 20
In addition to the criminal justice area, the Supreme Court
frequently employs scorn in two additional categories: law re-
form cases, and claims brought by plaintiffs who are nontradi-
tional in some way Bowers v. Hardwick.2 is a prime illustra-
tion of the latter. Bowers is replete with cool references to the
plaintiff, a gay man.'22 But the way in which the Court framed
the issue before it reveals its contempt for the plaintiffs claim.
Writing for the Court, Justice White framed the issue as
"whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy"' 2 Blackmun's dissent
takes exception to that characterization, urging that the issue at
118. Id. at 199.
119. Id. at 207 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 224 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
122. See, e.g., id. at 188 ("[hie asserted that he was a practicing homosexual"); id.
at 191 ("respondent would have us announce a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy"); id. at 196 ("[elven respondent makes no such claim").
123. Id. at 190.
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stake is much more fundamental: "the right to be let alone." 24
Commentators have argued that even this way of framing the
issue does not go far enough, and that the reasomng that en-
abled the Court to adopt its version will not bear scrutiny 125
One of these framing devices is the Court's use of history Chief
Justice Burger, in concurrence, goes to considerable lengths to
rail against homosexuality itself, presenting a historical exposi-
tion of Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards, pointing
out that sodomy was a capital crime under Roman law, and
concluding with an inflammatory quotation from Blackstone.
121
In light of all that he asserted, "[To hold that the act of homo-
sexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right
would cast aside millenma of moral teaching."1 27 The fram-
ing of the issue as one of a right to sodomy is what leads to the
language condemning that practice, but it is contempt for the
plaintiffs homosexuality that first must have led to such a char-
acterization and hence to the opportunity for the Court to pres-
ent its moral findings as it did.
Law reform cases, and ones brought on behalf of the poor,
often display a similar attitude on the Court's part. For example,
in Wyman v. James, 28 the Supreme Court upheld a New York
law requiring home visitation as a prerequisite for receiving
AFDC benefits. 29 Proving that even liberals can be guilty of
scorn, Justice Blackmun wrote:
[W]hat Mrs. James appears to want from the agency that
provides her and her infant son with the necessities for life is
the right to receive those necessities upon her own informa-
i24. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
125. For a sample of critical commentary, see Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and
the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187; David A.J. Richards, Constitu-
tional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800 (1986).
126. Bowers,. 478 U.S. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("Blackstone described
'the infamous crime against nature' as an offense of 'deeper malignity' than
rape ") (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES *215).
127. Id. at 197.
128. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
129. Id. at 326.
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tional terms, to utilize the Fourth Amendment as a wedge for
nposmg those terms, and to avoid questions of any kind.'30
"The home visit," he continued, "is not a criminal investigation,
does not equate with a criminal investigation, and despite the
announced fears of Mrs. James and those who would join her, is
not in aid of any criminal proceeding." 3' In dissent, Justice
Douglas pointed out: "If the welfare recipient was not Barbara
James but a prominent, affluent cotton or wheat farmer receiv-
ing benefit payments for not growing crops, would not the ap-
proach be different?"'32 Justice Marshall added, "I find no little
irony in the fact that the burden of today's departure from
principled adjudication is placed upon the lowly poor. Perhaps
the majority has explained why a commercial warehouse de-
serves more protection than does this poor woman's home. I am
not convinced." 3'
D When the Target Is an Attorney, or an Attorney in Additin to
a Client or an Idea
Recently amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure has provided an outlet for a fourth type of judicial derision,
namely that directed against the attorney foolish enough to
bring an "unwarranted" lawsuit. Rule 11 instructs a court to
impose sanctions when it finds that a signed "pleading, motion,
or other paper" is unfounded or frivolous.'34 As many feared,
130. Id. at 321-22.
131. Id. at 323.
132. Id. at 332 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 347 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134. Rule 11 provides that:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the
signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that
to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by exist-
ing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or re-
versal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court shall impose upon
the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction
FED. R. Civ. P 11 (amended 1993).
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the rule seems to have been used disproportionately to punish
attorneys and clients who brought civil rights suits or ones who
sought to vindicate unpopular or new interests."5 To the judge
hearing the case, such a suit easily can appear farfetched, ill
motivated, and a waste of everyone's time.
Because of the rule's relatively brief history, few Supreme
Court cases have interpreted it; most of the case law is found at
the district or circuit court level. For example, in Szabo Food
Servce, Inc. v. Canteen Corp.,"' a minority firm sued over
Cook County's failure to comply with its own minority set-aside
program. Following the plaintiffs voluntary dismissal and refil-
ing in state court, the district court found that Rule 11 sanctions
were inappropriate. 3 On appeal, a panel of the Seventh Cir-
cuit agreed that the complaint warranted sanctions and remand-
ed the case to the lower court to fix an amount. "If one citizen of
Illinois files a suit based on state law against another citizen of
Illinois," Judge Easterbrook wrote, "a federal court lacks juris-
diction so too if a plaintiff files a specious civil rights suit,
for an absurd complaint does not even invoke federal question
jurisdiction." 8' Moreover, he reasoned, "[i]f the complaint is
indeed too silly to create subject matter jurisdiction, attorneys'
fees should be an ordinary incident of the award of costs."3 9
The plaintiff, however, had to endure more than being labeled
silly, absurd, and the drafter of a specious complaint.
Easterbrook went on to ridicule one of his arguments as follows:
You can get only so far with the comparison to a suit never
filed, however Suppose the plaintiff files a suit, seeks a
TRO, m the midst of the hearing asks to approach the bench,
emits a Bronx cheer, punches the judge m the nose, and as
the judge reaches for a handkerchief to stanch the bleeding
tenders a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(i). In reply to the
inevitable citation for contempt of court, the plaintiff could
not say- "I wasn't there in the eye (nose?) of the law; nothing
135. Arthur B. LaFrance, Federal Rule 11 and Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL.
U. L. REV. 331 (1988).
136. 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988).
137. Id. at 1076.
138. Id. at 1077-78.
139. Id. at 1078.
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happened for which I am responsible; for 'it is as if the suit
had never been brought.' ,14O
After a few more pages detailing plaintiffs derelictions, the opin-
ion concluded with: "Szabo-Digby's theory of due process is
wacky, sanctionably so.""
Other judges have imposed penalties on plaintiffs who have
lost civil rights cases, using such terms as "fantasies,"
"shocking,"'' "absurd,"'" and "unsubstantiated, self-serving,
contradictory, and inconsistent"'45 to ekplain their decision. As
we noted earlier, judges reserve some of their choicest scorn for
suits brought by prisoners. The Fifth Circuit described one such
suit as "patently meritless,"146 "frivolous,"47 and calculated to
"try even the most patient members of this court."'" It said it
"[would] not dignify by discussion the merits of the case," 49 di-
rected that the plaintiff "file no further action in any court in
this circuit until the sanction levied by the district court is satis-
fied,"'5 ° and warned "that such continued abusive conduct will
trigger increasingly severe sanctions, including the ultimate
denial of access to the judicial system absent specific prior court
approval.''
In a final illustration, the same circuit considered a case
brought by a pro se plaintiff who complained of several things
including dirty prison cell ventilation, a conspiracy by the war-
den to turn the inmates into homosexuals, and overpricing of
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1080.
142. Hams v. Marsh, 679 F Supp. 1204, 1224 (E.D.N.C. 1987) ("Some of the fac-
tual allegations can most charitably be termed 'fantasies.' "), affd in part, rev'd in
part and remanded sub nom. Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525
(4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991).
143. Harris, 679 F Supp. at 1226 (The "cavalier attitude" of the plaintiff "was and
remains shocking.").
144. Id. at 1225.
145. Id. at 1267.
146. Jackson v. Carpenter, 921 F.2d 68, 69 (5th Cir. 1991).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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paper and rulers at the commissary 152 The trial court had dis-
missed the case and fined the plaintiff $150. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed, concluding that "[the prisoner's] issues utterly lack
merit, and we refuse to dignify them by further discussion." 53
It therefore ordered that he not be allowed to file any additional
appeals until he paid the $150 sanction levied by the district
court.
154
Recently proposed amendments to Rule 11 may reduce the
amount of litigation brought under it by providing that offending
parties compensate the court, not their adversary, and by mak-
ing sanctions discretionary rather than mandatory "' But
while the rule was in effect it provided a revealing mirror into
the way judges think about racial discrimination, prisoner, civil
rights, and other similar suits.
E. When the Target Is Another Court, Another Justice, or the
Supreme Court of Another Era
Supreme Court opimon-writers sometimes vent their spleens
at lower courts, at each other, or at a predecessor Court. Four
civil rights decisions from the modern era illustrate scorn and
sarcasm directed by one member or wing of the Court at anoth-
er. In three, the Court found for a minority plaintiff, while con-
servative justices in dissent blasted their more liberal col-
leagues. In a fourth, in which the Court chose not to play its
countermajoritarian role, liberal justices in dissent excoriated
the majority
In Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC,'56 the Court held that
the Federal Communication Commission could employ racial
preferences in granting licenses in order to redress long-standing
imbalances in the radio broadcast industry 57 In dissent, Jus-
tice O'Connor derided the FCC as a know-it-all agency, stating
"[the FCC has concluded that the American broadcasting public
152. Vinson v. Texas Bd. of Corrections, 901 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1990).
153. Id. at 475.
154. Id.
155. See Stephame B. Goldberg, On and On: Will the New Amendments Cut Rule
11 Litigation Down to Size?, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 80-82.
156. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
157. Id. at 600.
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receives the incorrect mix of ideas."15 Of course, the FCC did
not maintain that it knew what ideas the public should receive,
but rather that minority broadcasters (and their ideas) were
being excluded, a much different proposition. Justice Kennedy
went even further, equating the Court's treatment with the
infamous separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,"9
and evoking the horrors of that era by quoting passages from a
South African government publication about apartheid. 60
A similar attempt at redressing past injuries was the subject
of a suit brought by a male worker demed a promotion in favor
of what he believed was a less qualified female worker in John-
son v. Transportatwn Agency 161 The Court held that the use of
sex as a factor in considering promotions was justified by past
discrimination and current underrepresentation.'62  Justice
Scalia, in dissent, declared that "[t]he Court today completes the
process of converting [Title VII] from a guarantee that race or
sex will not be the basis for employment determinations, to a
guarantee that it often will."' He further argued that the
Court in bowing to the pressure of organized special inter-
ests-presumably the women's transportation workers advocacy
group-had run roughshod over the unprotected and disenfran-
chised.' But just who are these disenfranchised? The plaintiff
in Johnson was a man in a predominantly male field. The de-
fendant transportation agency employed no female road dis-
patchers and all but a few of its female employees worked in
traditional clerical jobs. 65 This did not stop Scalia, however,
who sympathized with male plaintiffs such as Johnson, stating:
158. Id. at 616 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
159. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
160. Id. at 631-38 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
The following statement would fit well among those offered to up-
hold the Commission's racial preference policy: "The policy is not based
on any concept of superiority or inferiority, but merely on the fact that
people differ, particularly in their group associations, loyalties, cultures,
outlook, modes of life and standards of development."
Id. (quoting SOUTH AFRICA AND THE RULES OF LAW 37 (1968)).
161. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
162. Id. at 640-42.
163. Id. at 658 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 677.
165. Id. at 618, 620-23.
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"The irony is that these individuals-predominantly unknown,
unaffluent, unorgamzed-suffer this injustice at the hands of a
Court fond of thinking itself the champion of the politically im-
potent."'166
Justice Rehnquist provides a third example not only of scorn
and derision, but of an astomshingly patromzing tone. FCC v.
League of Women Voters161 presented a challenge to an FCC
regulation which prohibited government-funded public broad-
casting stations from editorializing. The Court struck down the
regulation, which made Rehnquist unhappy His "Little Red Rid-
ing Hood" response is as follows:
All but three paragraphs of the Court's lengthy opinion in
this case are devoted to the development of a scenario in
which the Government appears as the "Big Bad Wolf," and
appellee Pacifica [co-respondent with the League of Women
Voters] as "Little Red Riding Hood." In the Court's scenario
the Big Bad Wolf cruelly forbids Little Red Riding Hood to
take to her grandmother some of the food that she is carrying
in her basket. Only three paragraphs are used to delineate a
truer picture of the litigants, wherein it appears that some of
the food in the basket was given to Little Red Riding Hood by
the Big Bad Wolf hnself, and that the Big Bad Wolf had told
Little Red Riding Hood in advance that if she accepted his
food she would have to abide by his conditions."s
The Court abandoned its countermajoritaran role in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.'69 This departure gave the liberal
Justices in dissent an opportunity to exercise their skill at scorn
and derision. Because it was directed upward at a portion of the
Court upholding the power of the majority, this could be consid-
ered a rare example of "bemgn" scorn. In Croson, the Court
addressed the constitutionality of a "minority business utiliza-
tion plan" adopted by the city of Richmond, Virginia.' ° The
plan required construction contractors dealing with the city to
subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of each
166. Id. at 677.
167. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
168. Id. at 402-03 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
169. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
170. Id. at 477.
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contract to one or more minority-owned businesses.' 7 ' The
Richmond City Council considered this percentage reasonable in
a city roughly fifty percent black.7 The majority disagreed,
holding that the thirty percent quota rested "upon the 'complete-
ly unrealistic' assumption that minorities will choose a particu-
lar trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the
local population."' 3 This is a mischaracterization: "lockstep
proportion" would be 50%; moreover, if one wanted to quarrel
over numbers, the starting point would need to be the actual
minority representation among recipients of prime construction
contracts in Richmond of 0.67%.1"
The factual distortions and second guessing of the decisions of
the Richmond City Council, which was five-mnths black, were
based on the majority's view that the Council's action was "sun-
ple racial politics."' 5 The dissent disagreed. Given Richmond's
history, "to suggest that the facts on which Richmond has relied
do not provide a sound basis for its finding of past racial dis-
crimnation simply blinks credibility ""' Moreover, Justice
Marshall wrote: "The majority's view that remedial measures
undertaken by municipalities with black leadership must face a
stiffer test of Equal Protection Clause scrutiny implies a lack
of political maturity on the part of this Nation's elected minority
officials that is totally unwarranted. Such insulting judgments
have no place in constitutional jurisprudence."'
As we have shown, members of the Court can use blunt lan-
guage with each other, and even harsher language with attor-
neys and parties appearing before them. Occasionally the Court
has an opportunity to employ similar words when discussing its
own previous actions, or those of a lower court.
For example, the Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner"8 re-
versed a hundred-year-old rule concerning personal jurisdiction.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 478-80.
173. Id. at 507.
174. See id. at 479-80.
175. Id. at 493.
176. Id. at 541 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 555.
178. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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In Pennoyer v. Neff,"'9 the Court had articulated the territorial
view of personal jurisdiction, under which a plaintiff needed to
serve the defendant personally within the state, or else find
property there belonging to the defendant and bring it before the
court. 80 In Shaffer and a second case,18" ' the Supreme Court
abandoned this approach in favor of one based on minimum
contacts and fairness.'82 Its treatment of Pennoyer was rela-
tively gentle and restrained. In neither opimon did the Court
mention that it was overruling a century-old classic. The Court
discussed how the old rule had become riddled with exceptions
and weakened by modern commercial realities to the point
where it no longer served its original purpose.' 3 The tone was
moderate and respectful, assuring the venerable rule and its
distinguished author (Justice Field) a decent burial.
The Court is not always so gentle with lower courts whose
rulings and decisions it finds errant. For example, the Court
recently reversed a Mississippi Supreme Court ruling respecting
the Fifth Amendment rights of an accused and his request for
the assistance of counsel. In Minnzck v. Mississipp , M the
Court chided the state court for its failure to uphold the rule
that an interrogation must cease upon the accused's request for
counsel and his stated wish to commiumcate with the authorities
only through one.'85 Such a mistake could not be allowed to
stand because of the clear and unequivocal guidelines stated in
the Court's earlier decisions."8 ' The Supreme Court also ad-
momshed the state court not to detract from the "affirmation of
individual responsibility that is a principle of the criminal jus-
tice system," and in the future to avoid both waiver of rights and
admissions of guilt that are contaminated by the coercive pres-
sures of custody ...
179. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
180. Id. at 731.
181. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
182. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211, 215-16.
183. Id. at 196-206; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-20.
184. 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
185. Id. at 151-53.
186. Id. at 150-52.
187. Id. at 155.
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In summary, it appears that the Supreme Court reserves its
sharpest language for plaintiffs, particularly ones who file suits
with which the Court feels little empathy Here, the sarcasm is
apt to be heavy and blunt, falling into the categories of invective
or derision as we have defined them. When the target is broader
or more abstract, such as an entire legal theory or group of
plaintiffs, the verbal attack is apt to be more refined, if no less
scathing. Perhaps because judges respect legal reasoning, the
adversary is treated to greater attention and deference. We have
fewer "Little Red Riding Hood" tales, but more deftness, detail,
and wit. The level of writing at times approaches that of true
satire, with metaphors marshaled, comparisons made, literary
allusions deployed. When the target is another court, the level of
asperity is apt to fall somewhere in between-more gentle and
solicitous than that aimed at a seriously offending attorney, but
not so mild as that directed against its own ruling or precedent.
The degree of sharpness ranges between what we have described
as caricature and irony By contrast, we found no case of the Su-
preme Court, in recent history at least, treating in any seriously
satirical way the action of a federal agency, the military, an
upper-level law enforcement figure, or a large, multinational
corporation. The Court reserves its most withering language for
law reform cases or ones brought on behalf of groups like prison-
ers, gays, environmentalists, and blacks, that it sees as falling
outside its circle of concern.'88
IV THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION: A THEORY OF THE APPROPRIATE
ROLE OF SATIRE AND HUMOR
As we mentioned in the Introduction, our theory of humor and
satire is relatively straightforward." 9 Reduced to its essentials
we believe that satire should be reserved for targets of higher
status and power than the speaker, never lower. Now it is time
for us to explain and defend our thesis in greater detail. We first
argue for our up-down distinction in general, bringing to bear
188. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357 (1992); David 0.
Stewart, Advantage Government: Is It Easier for the Government to Win in the Su-
preme Court?, A.B.A. J., July 1992, at 46.
189. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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considerations of etymology, intuition, past practice, and the
social psychology of humor. Then we apply our insight to the
special situation of courts.
A. Etymology: The Root Meaning of Humor
A root of "humor" is humus-that is, ground or earth.' Al-
though humor and ridicule can of course be directed at the lowly
and the weak, 9' it appears that a principal function in all ages
has been that of calling to account the high and the
mighty-bringing them down to earth. Early Greek playwrights
and satirists such as Aristophanes made fun of the foibles and
vices of the gods, the ruling class, and sometimes mankind in
general.'92 Early Roman emperors employed accompanists to
march or stand with them during victory parades and other
state occasions. This servant's role was to whisper periodically,
"thou art but a man."'93 Early European royalty employed
court jesters to mock and make light of their own mannerisms
and excesses.'94 Although the early meaning of humor, of
190. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (defining term).
191. See, e.g., infra notes 186-93 and accompanying text. For examples from court
opinions, see supra part III.
192. See, e.g., ARISTOPHANES, supra note 35. Aristophanes' other plays also made
fun at the expense of rulers, charlatans, frauds, pompous philosophers, and the
Atheman ruling class. See ARISTOPHANES, THE ACHARNIANS (Douglass Parker, trans.),
in FOUR COMEDIES (William Arrowsmith ed., 1969) (spoofing Euripides in a satire of
militarism, war, and politics); ARISTOPHANES, THE CLOUDS (William Arrowsmith,
trans.), in THREE COMEDIES (William Arrowsmith ed., 1969) (satirizing the teachings
of the Sophists); ARISTOPHANES, LYSISTRATA (Douglass Parker, trans.), in FOUR COM-
EDIES, supra (playing on the theme of the battle of the sexes); see also PERSIUS,
SATIRE IV, in JUVENAL'S SATIRES, supra note 22, at 200 (criticizing statesmen who
failed to examine their true place m the world).
193. CLASSICAL AND FOREIGN QUOTATIONS 326 (W. Francis H. King ed. & trans., 3d
ed. 2d prtg. 1965) (1889). The same entry goes on to note that the Russian Tsars at
the time of their coronation were presented (along with their scepters, presumably)
specimens of marble from which to select for their tombs. Id.
194. See DR. JOHN DORAN, THE HISTORY OF COURT FOOLS (1858) (describing the
court jesters of England, France, Spain, Germany, and Italy); ENID WELSFORD, THE
FOOL. HIS SOCIAL AND LITERARY HISTORY (1935) (discussing the role of the court
jester in the medieval, Renaissance, and Tudor eras); see also FEINBERG, INTRODUC-
TION TO SATIRE, supra note 20, at 188-89; HIGHET, supra note 20, at 77, 94-96 (re-
lating pranks, hoaxes, jokes and parodies ained at queens, the Royal Navy, and
other such high groups). Recall also Anatole France's famous remark spoofing unfair
laws: "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids all men to sleep under
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course, is not decisive, it nevertheless gives some indication of
what humor's central function might be today Considerations of
historical practice, current intuition, and structural justice en-
able us to add to our basic insight that humor generally should
be reserved for use against the strong.
B. Past Practice
Again, while not decisive, past practice argues for our general
thesis. Throughout history, the best humorists and satirists have
aimed their arrows either at the ruling class, or at some group
that in the aggregate could be described as empowered. '95
Thus, as we showed earlier, Molibre mocked the vanities and
absurdities of his nation's aristocracy, or, sometimes, those of
the nouveaux riches.'96 Voltaire reserved his best barbs for so-
cial climbers."' Jonathan Swift wrote his slyest, most savage
denunciations of heartless bureaucrats and rulers."' Today's
newspaper satirists concern themselves with abuses of power,
and so on.'99
It is possible to find exceptions, to be sure: a famous author
tells a dunce tale at the expense of an industrial worker who
loses a finger by accident, is recompensed, and decides to lose
another;. 0 women were a common object of humor in the Clas-
sical period;01 snobs of all ages would sometimes enjoy a laugh
at the expense of the naive or unsophisticated.0 2 Sinclair Lew-
bridges " DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 363 (Bergen Evans ed., 1968).
195. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text; see also FEINBERG, INTRODUC-
TION TO SATIRE, supra note 20, at 254 ("By the nineteenth century in France when
the press became especially vehement, the custom had grown of saying, 'It's
Voltaire's fault.' ").
196. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 12-13, 33 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 11, 37 and accompanying text.
200. FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note 20, at 168-69.
201. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text; HIGHET, supra note 20, at 39
(describing an iambic poem by Semomdes of Amorgos dating from seventh century
B.C. "surveying the different types of wives" and praising only one); see also
JUVENAL, Satire VI, supra note 22.
202. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (illustrating bumpkin jokes); see
also ROBERT C. ELLIOT, THE POWER OF SATIRE: MAGIC, RITUAL, ART 85 (1960) (de-
scribing the ridicule of immigrants and ethnic groups); FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO
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is,"' H.L. Mencken,0 4 and Aldous Huxley05 made fun of
the mddle class; Orwell of the "proletarians. " '2 And, in our
time, one sees an upsurge of misguided humor aimed at minor-
ties and immigrants."' Yet, "[iut is no longer considered proper
to laugh at the crippled and the insane, as it was in
Shakespeare's day 1;208 We tend to find such humor mean-
spirited, "sheer invective."2 9 It lacks the detachment, indirec-
tion, subtlety, or social reformist quality of the better forms of
parody, irony, and satire. When satirists tirelessly
"[aittack[ed] individuals in public life and in institutions
[the] awe of greatness vamshed And whereas there had
once been discussions [of] the divine right of kings, these
were succeeded by candid admission that monarchs were as
susceptible to error as any of their subjects."210 In our time,
Jay Leno, the newly-appointed host of NBC's Tonight Show,
explained that he favors "topical humor, hammering political
figures," rather than "four-letter words and testosterone-
laced ranting against women, gays and various ethnic
groups." '' He joins such comics as Will Rogers, Bob Hope,
Gary Trudeau, and Johnny Carson in carefully aiming humor
upward.
SATIRE, supra note 20, at 215-18.
203. See LEWIS, supra note 43 (depicting the typical middle-class American as com-
placently mediocre).
204. See MENCKEN, supra note 42, at 54-57.
205. See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932) (satirizing the hedomsm, con-
sumerism, and social conformity in the modem western world); see also FEINBERG,
THE SATIRIST, supra note 20, at 50.
206. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 203, 210-11 (1949).
207. For a discussion of this brand of humor, see ELLIOTT, supra note 202, at 85;
Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 133-38 (1982); see also JUDICIAL Hu-
MORIST, supra note 49, at 243-45; William L. Prosser, Lighthouse No Good, I J. LE-
GAL EDUC. 257 (1948) (commenting on a joke made at the expense of an Indian).
208. FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note 20, at 210.
209. Id. at 108 (suggesting that invective may not be properly called satire because
it is over-literal: "its effectiveness depends on the assumption that it means just
what it says'); see also HIGHET, supra note 20, at 155 (contrasting invective and
lampoon with comedy and other fare).
210. BLOOM & BLOOM, supra note 20, at 205.
211. Mike Duffy, Leno's Famous Face Granted Real Seal of Big Star Approval,
DENVER POST, May 17, 1992, at 8D.
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That the best humorists followed a certain practice does not of
course prove that they wrote as they did out of moral principle,
much less that such a principle is true. Some of the great sati-
rists may have spared the weak and the poor simply out of
sporting justice-out of a sense that such a victim could not
reply in kind-or out of snobbery, the sense that they were an
unworthy target. Yet, on the few occasions when the great prac-
titioners spoke of what they were doing, they often described
their writing in the same way- the satirst's province and high-
est calling is to act as social critic, dissecting the habits, pointing
out the foibles, and puncturing the pomposities of society's
elites.212
C. Intutiton
Both the etymology of the term and the dominant tendency of
their greatest practitioners argue that humor and satire should
never be aimed at the lowly This stance is in accord with intu-
ition as well. In a dozen areas of life, ranging from playground
protocol to international politics, we believe that it is wrong to
bully a weaker adversary,, that one should always "pick on some-
one your own size." The Bible, for example, admniomshes that we
should look after the poor, the lame, and our weaker broth-
ers.213 The Declaration of Independence justifies the colomes'
break with England, in part, on a series of abuses and tyranmes
the older country perpetrated on its fledgling outpost.2 4 A hun-
212. See e.g., FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO SATIRE, supra note 20, at 16 (on Jules
Feiffer); GARRY B. TRUDEAU, DOWNTOWN DOONESBURY (1986); William Grimes, Ed-
ward Sorel, Enlightenment Cartoonist, INTL HERALD TRIB., May 15-16, 1993, at 18
(depicting cartoonist as an old-fashioned satirist, in line with Swift and Voltaire, who
targets "pomposity, hypocrisy, vanity, and human folly" and describes the "noble
calling" of the cartoonist "to defend the powerless and attack injustice"); supra notes
10-13, 32-37, 178-84, 194-97 and accompanying text. Francis Bacon took a similar
view. See On Discourse, in ESSAYS 152 (1908); see also FEINBERG, INTRODUCTION TO
SATIRE, supra note 20, at 13, 24, 28-33 (unmasking pretense and other corrective
functions).
213. Deuteronomy 15:7; Proverbs 14:21, 17:5, 22:22; Acts 20:35; 1 John 3:17.
214.
When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people
to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with anoth-
er a decent respect to the opimons of mankind requires that they
should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.
dred myths, novels, sagas, and songs celebrate defenders who
champion the causes of weaker persons or groups.
Humor is a powerful social tool. Social psychologists and oth-
ers who have studied it believe it frequently is employed to mar-
shal social consensus against an outsider of some sort. In humor
one laughs, bares one's teeth, looks at and invites others to
laugh with one, often at the expense of another.21 It can lend
itself as easily to bullying as to the redress of injuries. In our
view, only the latter use is the appropriate one. Consideration of
the judiciary's function argues that this is even more true when
humor is deployed by courts.
D. Judicial Review
Consideration of the nature and function of judicial review
reinforces our conclusion that courts should refrain from using
sarcasm and mockery at the expense of the weak. By the same
token, wit and satire are perfectly appropriate when a court
finds that a powerful actor has abused power or behaved as
though it is above the law
A leading theory of judicial review holds that courts, particu-
larly the Supreme Court, are charged with exercising a
countermajoritanan function.21 In our system of politics, the
judiciary is the only branch of government capable of interven-
ing to protect a "discrete and insular minority" from discrimina-
tion at the hands of the majority 7 At the same time, the Su-
preme Court may often prove the only institution capable of
redressing excesses and abuses by other branches of govern-
ment, the military-industral complex, multinational corpora-
tions, and other powerful actors.1 ' For this reason judges have
The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of
repeated injuries and usurpations To prove this, let facts be sub-
mitted to a candid world
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1, 5 (U.S. 1776).
215. See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 10; ELY, supra note 10; LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1451-74 (2d ed. 1988).
217. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also
supra note 216.
218. E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (holding that the President
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lifetime tenure, are not easily removed from office, and are kept
distant from the pressures of political life. 19 Courts owe a duty
of suspicion toward the mighty, at the same time that they owe
a duty of solicitude to the weak." ° The rude remark, brusque
dismissal, and sarcastic or mocking treatment will rarely be in
order. The theories of humor and of the judicial function thus
coincide: sarcasm and invective should be reserved for the high
and powerful, never the lowly
Humor distances.22' It emphasizes the separation between
the one who employs it, and the one who is its butt. It invites
the reader or listener to join with the speaker in laughter at the
folly or plight of another. This is true virtually across the
board-parody, irony, sarcasm and caricature all share this fea-
ture to a greater or lesser extent. Indeed, as we have seen, theo-
rists believe that this distancing is one of humor's constitutive
features.222 Yet this quality renders humor and satire trouble-
some when deployed by a court, especially against the lowly
Racial minorities, mental patients, the poor, prisoners and oth-
ers are already lowly They come before the court in an effort to
improve their situation, to correct some injustice they have suf-
fered. Humor threatens to lower them even further, place them
even further outside society's concern. It tends to weaken empa-
thy, already in short supply "'
of the United States was subject to a subpoena duces tecum issued by a federal
court at the request of a Special Prosecutor in the Watergate investigation); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the "Pentagon Papers" case
ruling that the government failed to justify prior restraint of publication of classified
study).
219. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLI-
TICS 131 (2d ed. 1990).
220. See Richard Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in
Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1988) (endorsing a structure of suspicion,
checks and balances in the legal system, to critically analyze and challenge the
rhetoric of dominant parties).
221. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
222. Id.
223. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 6; Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy
Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1992) (citing the history of racial
caricatures in America which demeaned targeted minorities).
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The opposite genre, tragedy, will often prove a more fitting
model for courts considering what language to apply in such
cases. Tragedy emphasizes the commonalities in human experi-
ence, humanizes by reminding us of our common fate."
Courts, of course, cannot compose a work of great tragic litera-
ture every time they write an opimon rationalizing their treat-
ment of a prisoner or welfare recipient. But they can restrain
their instinct to laugh, to make fun at the expense of those less
fortunate than they They can aim for a tone that is sober and
respectful, reserving their barbs, their wit, their flourishes for
more worthy targets-for empowered actors who have distanced
themselves from the rest of us, have violated the public trust,
and deserve to be brought low They can deploy humor, tragedy,
respect and iconoclasm appropriately, selecting their tone and
language with a view to the features of the situation facing
them. They can keep their countermajoritanan role constantly
in their consciousness, reminding themselves, if necessary, of
the way history has treated their most serious lapses.22
V WHAT CAN BE DONE? REDRESSING MISGUIDED HUMOR
What can be done if a court repeatedly employs humor and
ridicule in the wrong way, i.e., against weak and defenseless
targets? Lower courts, of course, can be chastised and reversed
by higher ones. Judges who transgress egregiously, for example
by employing racist or sexist terms and belittlement, .can be dis-
ciplined or removed.226
Sometimes, however, these avenues will be unavailable. Then,
what options remain? One approach is simply to name what the
court is doing,"' calling it, for example, "nsguided and belit-
224. GEORGE STEINER, THE DEATH OF TRAGEDY (paperback 1980); RAYMOND WIL-
LIMS, MODERN TRAGEDY (1966).
225. See supra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., In re Rome, 542 P.2d 676 (Kan. 1973) (holding that a magistrate
court judge abused his discretion by writing an opinion in verse which scorned and
ridiculed a woman convicted of prostitution); Katherine Schweit, Judge Reprimanded
for Sexist Comments, CHICAGO DAILY L. BULL., July 31, 1987, at 1; Marshall
Rudolph, Note, Judicial Humor: A Laughing Matter?, 41 HAST. L.J. 175 (1989)
(pointing out the damaging effects of judicial humor).
227. For a discussion of the naming of an evil or problem as a necessary step
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tling humor evidencing an unjudicial attitude and lack of re-
spect." Sometimes, merely calling attention to a problem will
cause those who are creating it to change their behavior. It may
also bring out hitherto unknown allies who also had been trou-
bled by what the court had been doing.22 It may cause a court
with supervisory power over the first one to take notice and act.
One may also counterdeploy the powerful counternarrative of
the bully 229 In our society one is not supposed to take advan-
tage of those weaker than oneself. This amom is especially true
when applied to courts, particularly higher ones, who are
charged with giving litigants respectful attention. No one wants
to hear the line "have you no shame?" (or similar ones) applied
to oneself.
A third strategy is simply to remind the violator what the
historical fate of similar actors often has been. Holmes' remark
about three generations of imbeciles is now notorious and mars
an otherwise illustrious career 23 Recall also Marie
Antoinette's famous remark,231 Reagan's observation about red-
wood trees,232 and Justice Brown's comment about the injury of
being forced to ride in a segregated railroad car. 3' Pointing
out that history has not been lind to those who treat others
cavalierly can sometimes cause one's adversary to reconsider a
course of conduct. This may be particularly so with judges; it is
akin to being reversed.
toward recognizing and remedying it, see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do
We Tell the Same Stories?: Law Reform, Critical Librarianship, and the Triple Helix
Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1989).
228. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 227.
229. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Imposition, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1025 (1994).
230. See supra notes 76-87 and accompanying text; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note
6, at 1948-50.
231. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
232. William A. Snell, Environmental Politics, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1990, at B6
(letter to the Editor) (ridiculing Reagan's statement that "when you've seen one red-
wood, you've seen them all!").
233. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is not easy to control what will strike us as ridiculous and
unworthy of belief. We all have an internal canon-a group of
ingrained ideas that seem to us self-evidently true, sensible, and
just--indeed, that we use in evaluating new ideas to see wheth-
er they are true, sensible, and just. Ones that deviate too drasti-
cally from those we believe are apt to appear wrong and ex-
treme.
But merely because we have a tendency to scoff at that which
is new or different, it does not follow that we should. If our re-
search teaches anything, it is that consciousness changes, so
that the day's commonplace occurrences and ideas-separate
railroad cars for blacks and whites are constitutionally peris-
sible, three generations of "imbeciles" are enough-in time may
look quite different.
How can judges and others protect themselves against
history's judgment? We have proposed a simple, easily recalled
rule: satire, sarcasm, scorn, and similar tools only should be de-
ployed upward, at actors and institutions more empowered than
oneself. The sharp tools of scorn and irony rarely, if ever, should
be used against the weak and lowly This rule acquires added
force in the case of judges, because of the judiciary's special role
as countermajoritarian protector of minorities in our system of
politics. We showed that the Supreme Court today has been
breaching this rule with increased frequency, treating powerful
actors with exaggerated respect and deference and affording
curt, sometimes scornful treatment to society's out-groups. This
trend is troublesome on a number of levels. It can tarnish the
reputations of otherwise eminent justices, long after they leave
the bench. It can injure particular litigants, demoralizing them
and causing them to lose faith in the judicial system. And, if
continued, it portends serious damage to the legitimacy of the
Court as an institution.
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